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Abstract: .This paper estimates the money demand function for Jamaica using a 
Structural co-integrating VAR.  This approach  provides estimates of the  long run 
structural relations and also reveals the complex short run feedbacks of monetary 
policy on key macro variables.  In recent years Jamaican governments have adopted 
an inflation targeting framework for policy and have  moved towards reliance on   
interest rates rather than direct money control as the  primary instrument.  This 
policy presumes that monetary  transmission runs from the interest rate to directly 
affect the level of output which then feeds into the  inflation process.  However, in an 
economy with limited financial sector development  interest rate  transmission  may 
be more circumspect, having a strong  direct affect  on  money demand which then 
influences aggregate demand and  output and hence inflation. These feedbacks are 
investigated within the error correction model.. Stability of Money demand is vital for 
predictable policy, and  is investigated using CUSUM tests for parameter stability. 
The Jamaican financial sector suffered a major crisis in the mid 1990’s, the paper 
considers whether the stability of  money demand was compromised.   It is argued 
that the finding of  stable money demand  suggests that the specific policy responses 
may have successfully bolstered confidence and prevented financial implosion.   
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Financial Crises and Money Demand in Jamaica 
 
 
Introduction. 
This paper seeks to investigate two core issues.  Was there a stable long run money 
demand relationship in Jamaica and hence was there a sound basis for implementing 
indirect monetary policy ?   Was the money demand relationship stable throughout the 
domestic financial crises of the 1990’s ? The issue of stability is  important since it 
suggests that the government’s unorthodox rescue strategy  helped to maintain the 
necessary basis for  monetary policy implementation.   
 
Jamaica is a  small  open economy,  and  has operated a domestic currency since 
independence in 1962 and a stock exchange since 1969. The Jamaican Central Bank is 
responsible for monetary policy and the maintenance of price stability.   Until the 
1990’s a fixed exchange rate regime was maintained, but in the context of  a   
repressed financial system and low real interest rates,  it failed to operate as an 
effective inflation anchor.    With devaluation and the subsequent adoption of a 
floating rate in 1992 the financial system was liberalised and an explicit inflation 
targeting policy  was  adopted.  The focus shifted to open market control of the 
operating targets provided by the monetary base and associated interest rates 
instruments.  However, in the context of  the small open economy with a limited 
financial sector domestic  interest rates may not  transmit in expected  Keynesian 
fashion through output (Mishkin,1995), but rather transmit directly to demand and  
inflation. (Lattie, 1999).    If  such a monetary policy  is to offer an effective inflation 
strategy it is important that there is a a stable long run relation between monetary 
conditions and behaviour  of the public.  This relationship is captured in the demand 
for money which provides important information for appropriate monetary actions. 
 
The importance of  the money demand relation for policy formation has made it a 
popular but disputed  research topic.( Aristes, 1991:  Arize, 1994, Chow, 1966: 
Treichel, 1997: Khamis, 2001: Bahmani Oskoee 1994,2001,2002 and many others).   
In the Caribbean a number of  early studies (Bourne, 1974: Mclean, 1982: Watson, 
1988: Worrell, 1985) used single equations and were unable to clearly distinguish 
long and short run relations or feedbacks. More recent Jamaican  studies (Ghartey, 
1998, Watson, 2001) utilise co-integration methods but differ from one another and 
the current paper in terms of their specification(see section 2) and the  data period.  
Ghartey covers only up to 1993, Watson never specifies his time period although it 
most probably runs to 1998.  Neither piece considers the link between the domestic 
financial crises of the 1990s and stability of money demand.  A recent paper considers 
this link for Venezuela (Bjornland, 2005).  Bjornland  adopts a similar open economy 
cointegrating VAR approach to this paper and the relation between the two sets of 
results is discussed. 
 
Financial crises could be expected to cause problems for monetary policy  as they 
tend to destabilise money demand so limiting the effectivness and predictability of 
monetary policy. (Garcia- Herrero, 1997).  Jamaica has been shaken by two major 
financial crises.   The first arose in the 1980’s within the context of the radicalised 
domestic politics and  the international debt crisis.  The second major financial crisis 
erupted in the mid 1990’s and was associated with  liberalisation and the  speculative 
behaviour of  weakly regulated financial institutions.  In the second crisis the 
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Jamaican government avoided IMF assistance and the requisite policies  emphasising  
foreign exchange stabilisation and  closure of  troubled institutions.  In contrast it 
sought to maintain liquidity by rescuing  institutions and ensuring  depositor 
protection   The   paper argues that this approach  helped to maintain confidence in 
financial institutions,  and so  helped to maintain a  stable  money demand relationship 
and to avoid a  systemic crisis. 
 
 The first section of the paper briefly reviews the structure and operation of the 
Jamaican financial system, the second discusses the form, and estimates the money 
demand function and its stability.  The  presentation differs from  conventional single 
equation money demand , since the investigation uses a long run structural 
cointegrating  model which reveals   internal and external disequilibria and feedbacks.   
 
Character of the Jamaican Financial System. 
 
This section briefly reviews the historical development of the financial institutional 
structures and  the general architecture and  remit for monetary policy . 
 
Institutional Structure  
 
The Jamaican financial system emerged with independence in 1962.  The Bank of 
Jamaica Act (1960) established an independent Central Bank charged with 
safeguarding the value of the currency through the operation of monetary policy and 
ensuring overall stability of the system through supervision and regulation of deposit 
taking institutions.  The initial monetary policy relied on direct measures of control 
through reserve requirements and sought to regulate growth of money in line with the 
objective of  price and exchange rate stability,  whilst also  allowing  for sufficient  
monetary expansion to finance growth in economic activity (www.boj.org.jm).  The 
Financial Sector Reform Programme (1985), shifted policy by reducing the statutory 
reserve requirement from 48% to 20% ,  removing the secondary reserve 
requirements1, and moving towards open market operations to control  interest rates.  
With the move to inflation targeting the Bank became responsible for setting the 
target subject to approval of the Ministry of Finance.  The Bank then had to determine 
and manage the operating targets through the interest rate. However, the success of 
the indirect controls relies on a known and stable relationship between financial 
conditions and public behaviour.    
 
The deposit taking institutions supervised by the Bank and through which it conducts 
policy are: commercial banks, building societies and institutions licensed under the 
financial institutions act (merchant banks and trust companies.)  As a group the 
commercial banks are dominant, with an extensive branch network  they  account for 
about 50% of the total assets of the financial system. (Peart, 1995) . The near bank 
sector grew aggressively during liberalisation in the early 1990’s. 
 
Developments in the Financial Sector. 
 
From independence until the reforms enacted under  a World Bank Structural 
Adjustment Programme in 1985, Jamaica operated with a typical repressed financial 
system defined by high statutory reserve requirement,  administered  interest rates, 
fixed exchange rate, underdeveloped money and capital markets and consequent 
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domination of  financial intermediation by the commercial banks (Tsing & Corker, 
1991,  Peart, 1995).   The resultant shallow finance strategy generated a slow growing 
financial system with a limited capital or money market (Peart, 1995).  A further 
consequence was that local enterprises were highly dependent on bank funding, which 
then meant bank loan portfolios were often concentrated. 
 
The first attempt at financial deepening came in 1985 and involved a concerted 
attempt to move towards indirect instruments of control.  Secondary reserve 
requirements were abolished, interest rates moved to a  market determined structure, 
treasury bills were sold through open  market operations.  The result was increased 
intermediation and a disentangling of  monetary and fiscal policy (Peart, 1995).  
However,  the financial surge associated with reparation inflows following  Hurricane 
Gilbert in 1989 interrupted reforms and statutory primary and secondary reserve 
requirements were reintroduced. 
 
A second phase of reform came with the liberalisation of 1990/91, the deregulation of 
interest rates, the floating of the exchange rate and the opening of international 
financial flows. As shown in graph 1 & 2 and discussed below these reforms 
produced a period of steady growth in the M2 : GDP ratio  and positive real interest 
rates, both  indicative of financial deepening (Lynch,1996),  Liberalisation generated 
greater volatility in nominal interest rates so that both risk and the incentive to 
undertake risk were increased.  This period  generated particularly rapid growth of 
non- bank intermediaries which often acted outside prudential limits and  many loans 
were poorly assessed.  The commercial banks sought to use the lower regulation of 
the NBFI sector, by establishing  financial conglomerates and then shifting  risk onto 
the less supervised institutions.  The growth of this shadowy sector reflected the rapid 
deregulation and rising interest rates, these encouraged risky investment but did not 
significantly increase saving.   The overall  result  was a massive growth in private 
sector credit,70% in 1993, and a consequent consumption boom, but by 1997 almost 
30% of loans were non performing. (Kirkpatrick & Tennant, 2002  p.1936).   High 
risk activity was being pursued in the  insurance sector, which marketed short term 
high rate products while  investing  heavily in real estate so that the time profile of 
assets and liabilities became severely mismatched.  The interlocking of these entities 
meant that the illiquidity crisis of the non banks quickly spread across the sector with 
several commercial banks requiring  liquidity support in 1995/96 and the Ministry of 
Finance placed a number of institutions under temporary external  management.   In 
response to the growing crisis,  depositors started  withdrawing  savings from weak 
indigenous institutions and relocating to foreign banks  (Kirkpatrick & Tennant, 
2002).  This behaviour suggests a  breakdown in established domestic  money demand 
relations. 
 
Crisis 
 
 Demirguc-Kunt (2001) uses cross country evidence to support the argument that  
liberalisation  increases  the probability of  financial crisis,  Jamaica appears to have 
succumbed to the typical problems associated with premature liberalisation.   The 
majority of developing countries experiencing financial crises have accepted IMF  
wisdom that tight fiscal and monetary policy plus rapid and radical institutional 
restructuring are the best way to restore confidence (Heller, 1997).  Critics (Nixson, 
1999, Radelet, 1998, Stiglitz, 1999, 2002), have argued  that when implemented in 
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cases such as Thailand or Argentina these packages  subjected  depositors to 
substantial losses and exacerbated recession so  causing  further loss of  confidence in 
the financial sector. 
 
In contrast to this standard approach the Jamaican government adopted a fiscally more 
expensive strategy,  acting to safeguard all depositors with the aim of  maintaining 
confidence.  After the initial rescues, the government set up the Financial Services 
Adjustment Company (FINSAC, 1997) to intervene and rehabilitate.  This involved  
initial rescue followed by a series of  rationalisations and mergers, evident in the 
numerical shrinkage of all the sub-sectors (Table 1).  Although an unorthodox 
approach which created a large government deficit, the short run money supply effect 
was largely sterilised by use of securities to finance the deficit so that the package 
remained compatible with short term   inflation targeting.  However the extent of 
liabilities taken on by FINSAC in the rescue was equivalent to some two thirds of 
GDP and has created a spectre of medium term public sector insolvency as the total 
debt to GDP ratio  is now around 140%,  suggesting imminent servicing problems and 
new risks to the financial and real  sector.  
 
Table 1: Number of  Supervised Financial  Entities 
 
Institutions 1985a 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Commercial 
Banks 
10 9 9 9 6 6 6 
FIA 
Licensees 
8 28 27 18 14 11 11 
Building 
Societies 
n.a. 14 10 8 5 5 4 
Credit 
Unions 
n.a.  73 67 65 60 58 
 
 
Source : website :  http://www.boj.org.jm/superv_deposit_taking.asp
 a- taken from Peart , 1995 p.15 
 
Evidence on the Overarching Financial Strategy.  
 
The practice of  Jamaican  monetary policy indicates a period from 1960 –1985 where 
there was financial repression  involving a high reserve requirement, the non price 
rationing of credit,  and an administered interest rate.  This shallow finance approach 
is often associated with limited intermediation and  slow growth of the financial 
sector  as measured by M2:GDP.  A deepening of finance is usually associated with 
market based interest rates and consequent growth of  the financial system  (Shaw, 
1973)  and this should have occured with liberalisation in 1985.  
 
Graph 1 shows that the Jamaican financial system grew rapidly through the 1960’s  
presumably reflecting the buoyant economy, and inflows of FDI.  A high income 
elasticity of demand for  money, common in early development would have allowed 
for this rapid expansion in liquidity without a threat to inflation.  However,  the 
second phase of rapid expansion occurred between 1979-83  when the domestic 
economy had suffered several years of poor growth, high inflation and negative real 
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interest rates (Graph 2).  The reforms of 1985 seem to have been accompanied by a 
fall in growth of M2 : GDP  which actually contracts  until 1992  when it again shows 
positive and steady  expansion. 
 
Comparing the growth of M2 & M3 indicates relative expansion of the latter from 
1981-83 and again in 1987-88.  Since M3  includes non bank deposits this relative 
expansion suggests growth of  non bank financial institutions (NBFI).  The surprising 
aspect is that the share of NBFIs increased in the 1980’s but not during the 
liberalisation of the early 1990’s, they then shrank with the years of  crisis so that M3 
was not much greater than M2 by 1996.   Comparing this overall monetary  behaviour 
with that of the  real interest rate (Graph 2),  does not suggest  a clear or stable short 
run  link, real interest rates were negative from 1979-82 and were generally unstable 
until showing a more prolonged positive value from 1992.   
 
The steady positive growth in M2:GDP from 1992 is surprising given the deep 
financial sector crisis from 1994 onwards.  This behaviour raises two interesting 
possibilities.   First, there might be a  poor link between interest rates and financial 
growth which suggests that demand for money /liquid assets is inelastic with respect 
to the real interest rate, meaning  that any monetary  policy would have a limited 
impact.  This raises some doubts about the appropriateness of an  inflation targeting 
strategy pursued through interest rates and  open market policies unless  complex 
feedbacks occur.  Second the steady growth from 1992  suggests that the  Jamaican 
government’s rescue policy was successful in stabilising the financial system. 
 
Figure  1  
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Figure 2 
Real interest: Treasury bill
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Source : All data from WDI data base available from ESDSS  web site 
 
2.  Existence and Stability of the Jamaican Money Demand Relation. 
 
Demand for money is important when selecting an appropriate monetary policy.  
Inflation targeting requires that there is a known and stable transmission mechanism 
between monetary policy instruments and the macroeconomy.  The following  section 
considers the determinants of money demand and investigates  the stability of the 
underlying relation during and after the Jamaican  financial crises.   
 
Open market approaches to monetary policy generally presume that  interest rates  
have a short run effect on  activity, with the consequent deviation of output from its 
long run equilibrium  feeding  back to affect inflation (Mishkin,1995). This view of 
the interest rate transmission assumes that money supply adjusts to  ensure money 
market equilibrium.  In less developed financial systems, domestic interest rates are 
likely to  have only a small impact  on output,  so that interest  policy works through 
the credit channel and more directly  through  money supply  to affect inflation.  In 
this latter context, a money market equilibrium condition must be specified since it  
reveals  the extent to which changes in interest rates and the consequent  supply of 
money feed through to generate demand pressures and inflation.  In this scenario 
domestic monetary equilibrium is restored by adjustments of money demand.  In both 
cases it is important to know  the sensitivity of  money demand to interest rates and 
hence the responsiveness to monetary policy.   
 
Economic theory  specifies that  real money demand depends on a transaction and 
opportunity cost component.  In open  economies currency substitution and exchange 
rate risk may also be important influences (Arango and Nadiri, 1981).  The money  
demand function generally  uses  real income to  capture the transaction component; 
and  nominal  interest rate to capture  the  opportunity cost and asset component;  and 
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an exchange rate level and variance may be included to capture currency substitution 
and risk. 
 
If  interest rates  act  through the money supply,  the extent of feed through onto 
money demand  will reflect  the  demand for transaction balances.   If the elasticity of 
demand for transaction  balances is low, then a small increase in the money supply 
will have a significant effect on aggregate expenditure  and inflation. Conversely if 
income elasticity of money demand is high (>1) then  it is possible for the money 
supply to grow faster than real income without a threat to price stability.   This means, 
that if income elasticity (transaction demand) is unstable it will become difficult to 
predict the effects of monetary policy.  The second component  of money demand 
should be measured by a risk adjusted interest rate to capture opportunity cost and 
asset concerns.  In the estimation process this paper used nominal interest to capture 
the opportunity cost of money.  However, nominal interest is unlikely to fully reflect 
expected changes in inflation and hence risk (Laidler, 1985).  This problem is likely to 
be particularly acute when there is either financial repression or financial crisis, both 
of which occurred in Jamaica during the period of study. In the Jamaican context  risk  
considerations would cover exchange depreciation, surprise inflation, and  
institutional insolvencies all of which  increase during financial crises.   
 
In order to capture the dynamics of  money demand and its particular responses to 
shocks,  two long run relations are hypothesised to link the key variables : money, 
output, inflation, exchange rate and interest rate whose  adjustment to domestic and 
external disequilibria can be investigated.   Garratt et al (2003)  show that the this 
approach allows the imposition of  restrictions implied by long run structural relations 
whilst still allowing unrestricted estimation of the short run coefficients.   In the case 
of the small open economy this paper  hypothesises that  domestic monetary 
equilibrium (money demand) and external equilibrium (real exchange rate stability)  
are possible key  long run relationships.  
 
The existence of  the hypothesised long run relations are  tested by looking at the 
cointegrating equations for the system.  The identified long run relations are then 
tested in the context of  an error correction model for the system.  The strength of this 
approach is that it reveals both the speed of adjustment to shocks which may cause 
temporary deviations from the long run equilibrium conditions and also reveals the 
short term dynamics from coefficients on the lagged difference variables. 
 
Data 
 
The paper looks at annual data, ideally higher frequency  would be used but this is not 
available for  GDP.2 All data is obtained from World Bank’s WDI data base available 
from ESDSS  web site.  Currency in circulation (M) was measured by M2, the real 
value was derived by deflating with the consumer price index (P),  real GDP (Y) was 
used as a measure of  transactions in the demand for money function.  The nominal 
interest rate (R) was used to measure the opportunity cost of holding currency rather 
than real or financial assets.  The Treasury Bill Rate (TBR) was used since it reflected 
a close alternative asset.   The exchange rate (F) was measured by the exchange index 
and was initially included to take account of  currency substitution arising as a hedge 
against domestic financial risk. (Arango & Nadiri 1981). 
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 Long run currency demand  should show a positive relation with real transactions and 
a  negative relation with opportunity cost.  the relation with exchange rate could be in 
either direction.  A devaluation may create expectations of further devaluation and 
hence induce currency substitution or its dominant effect maybe to  increase the  value 
of foreign portfolios held by domestic residents,  creating a significant wealth effect 
and increasing money demand (Arango & Nadiri 1981).   A long run relation exists if  
the variables are cointegrated.  The real exchange stability  condition requires that the 
nominal exchange, price, output and interest rate  variables are  cointegrated. 
 
 
Figure 3  
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c) 
 
 Inflation and change in exchange rate.
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d) 
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e) 
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Source : All data from WDI. 
 
The figures above present the information on the main series involved in the currency 
demand relation.  Graph 3 (a) shows that real currency (m-p)  (lower case indicates 
log values) declined from 1972-1981, this also involved a decline in M2:GDP (Graph 
1) and suggests a period of demonetisations and financial sector shrinkage.  This 
probably reflected inflationary instability and the political uncertainty of the 
democratic socialist period  both of which would have contributed to the process of 
illegal capital flight in search of  quality.  Real currency then entered a period of 
renewed expansion from 1981 to 1987.  But this was stalled by the burst of inflation 
between 1987-91 and further exacerbated by the financial sector crisis of  1993/4, 
these again caused some demonetisations.  But the faltering growth returned to trend 
once the FINSAC rescue safeguarded depositors and repaired confidence in and 
credibility of the financial system.  Real GDP (transaction variable) and real currency 
show a positive relationship although GDP exhibits weaker growth and a smoother 
path. 
 
Graph (b), shows that until financial liberalisation in the mid 1980’s, interest rates 
were low and stable, while inflation became unstable from 1970, only returning to 
low and more stable behaviour in the late 1990’s.  Interest rates remained flat until the 
1980’s, but rising inflation and financial repression generated significantly negative 
real interest rates.  Interest rates show some catch-up adjustment in  the 1980’s 
becoming briefly positive following 1985 liberalisations.  Inflation spiralled until 
1991, when the more comprehensive internal and external liberalisation ushered in a 
period of positive real interest rate, and the nominal interest rate becomes more 
variable as it is used as an instrument of financial control.   Post 1985,  inflation and 
interest rates begin to show greater similarity in behaviour, with inflation showing  
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greater fluctuations and generally preceding interest changes.   After the initial years 
(1994-96) of  financial crises, interest and inflation shift  to a downward trend.  
 
Graph (c) shows no clear relation between the exchange rate and inflation although it 
appears that devaluation tends to be a precursor of an inflationary spurt.  Graph (d) 
show velocity {y-(m-p)} as stable in the low inflation period, but increasing steadily 
thereafter, with sharper rises following inflation bursts.  Graph (e) shows a close 
relation between log exchange index and log cpi.   
 
In total, the graphs indicate a possible long run cointegrating  relationship between m,  
y, R  and p  corresponding to a long run money demand relation , and a second 
possible relation  between f, p and velocity (y-(m-p)) indicating a real exchange rate 
equilibrium. 
 
Money Demand Function 
 
The majority of  money demand  studies (Arize, 1994, Chow, 1966: Treichel, 1997: 
Khamis, 2001: Bahmani Oskoee 1994,2001,2002, Ghartey, 1998)  have concentrated 
on single equations and have not therefore exploited the strength of the Johansen 
method in revealing multiple long run relations.   This paper seeks to investigate the 
Jamaican financial sector with   such a structural VAR system.  Two recent papers 
estimate  Jamaican money demand, Ghartey (1998) estimates only the single 
cointegrating relation despite a λ test suggesting two. Watson (2001) proposes a 
Structural VAR system to investigate Jamaican money demand, but chooses to 
specify a closed  domestic money sector, which seems unrealistic for an  small open 
economy.   The remainder of this section proposes long run internal and external  
financial relationships which it seeks to identify as cointegrating vectors, it  then looks 
at the error correction process and short run adjustment.  
 
 The long-run Money demand function used is of a standard logarithmic  form 
(Zarembka, 1968), no exchange variable is included since the rate was fixed for much 
of the period and therefore could not have a long run influence: 
 
d RM Y P eβ λ δ εα +=  
which is estimated as  
1 (1)
0, 0, 1
t t t t tm y R pα β δ λ ε
β δ λ
= + + + +
> < =  
 
The exchange rate equation is estimated as 
 
2 (2)
0; 1; 0
t t t t tf a by cp dR
b c d
ε= + + + +
> = <  
 
m : log nominal money in circulation  (M2) 
y : log real GDP 
f : log  exchange rate index (J$/US$, hence increase with devaluation) 
R : nominal interest rate   
p :  log consumer price index 
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The hypothesised long run relation should be represented by   two cointegrating 
vectors, which means that there need to be two just identifying restrictions on each 
equation. These are the two normalisation restrictions and the restriction that the 
exchange rate does not appear in the  money demand function and money does not 
appear in the real exchange rate equation.  In the short run, both the internal and 
external disequilibria terms can influence all variables.   
 
In order to imbed these two long run relations in a model, it is necessary  to check 
whether all relevant variables are I(1) The annual data runs from 1962-2002, the 
augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test computed for the levels and first differences of 
the variables are reported in Table 1 and indicate that all relevant variables can be 
treated as I(1)  with the unit root hypothesis rejected on their first differences.  This 
makes it valid to investigate cointegration. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2  ADF statistics  
 
Variable ADF Variable ADF 
m 0.1 ∆m 3.4*
p -1.0 ∆p -3.1*
R -1.75 ∆R -13.8 **
y -2.7 ∆y -4.6**
f - 0.06  ∆f -4.0**
m-p -1.73 ∆(m-p) -3.8**
 
* Reject unit root at 5%,  ** Reject unit root at 1%,   
 
To test and estimate the long run relationships  a second order VAR  with unrestricted 
intercept  and restricted trends was selected  and   the Johansen test was applied to the 
five core variables.   Both the eigenvalue and trace statistics suggested the existence 
of two cointegrating vectors at the 5% level.  This supports the underlying theoretical 
specification of the model. 
 
The cointegrating equations were estimated with a trend and  revealed  the existence 
of  the hypothesised long run internal and external relationships.     The estimated 
cointegrating relations are: 
                                                                        
117.35 1.56 1.46 0.72 0.05 (3)tm y R p t ε= + + + + +         
s.e.               0.11       .28        .04      .006 
t                  13.35    5.23     18.04      8.18 
 
 
228.05 1.25 1.62 1.15 0.08 (4)tf y R p t ε= + + + − +  
s.e.               .34       .80        .11          .02 
t                   3.75     1.62      10.11     4.6 
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These two cointegrating relationships have sensible economic interpretations, the first 
being a long run domestic currency demand equation and the second a real exchange 
(or foreign currency demand)  relationship, (this equation  excludes a foreign price 
level variable on the assumption that this has shown relatively little variation). 
 
All the coefficients are significant and carry the expected signs,  except for the 
interest rate.  The equations provide evidence for long run relationships.  In 
accordance with theory,  money demand  is strongly dependent on transaction needs: 
the income elasticity is  greater than one,  indicating scope for the growth of  the 
money supply to exceed that of output  without  being highly inflationary.  The 
interest rate is normally assumed  to capture the opportunity cost (real returns on 
financial assets plus cost of inflation) of holding money.   This opportunity cost 
relation should  imply a negative coefficient on interest, however the estimated   semi 
elasticity  is significant and positive.  The unexpected result may be explained in two 
ways.  Firstly, it may be a data problem: in the context of a shallow financial system 
the treasury bill rate and deposit rate move together (Correlation: 0.9  for Jamaican 
rates).   In this context  it is possible that the treasury bill rate  is proxying for ‘own 
rate’ rather than opportunity cost  (Crockett & Evans, 1980).  Alternatively it may 
reflect problems associated with risk since the  measured interest  is not a risk 
adjusted rate.  Unaccounted risk aspects could relate to inflation and institutional 
insolvencies, both of which increased in the financial crises of the early 1990s, and 
coincided with the much greater  interest rate variability  resulting from financial  
liberalisation.  The consequence  may be that adjustments in the reported rate have not 
accurately captured  the relevant underlying risk adjusted rate.  In practice the 
liberalisation of the 1990’s was associated with higher real interest rates, financial 
deepening and a greater holding of money reflected in the rising velocity of 
circulation (graph 3(d)).  Thus the interest rate may be acting as a proxy for 
liberalisation.  The significant and positive trend suggests increased monetisation of 
the economy over time. 
 
 The second cointegrating equation can be interpreted as  a real exchange rate 
relationship.  The estimation gives the expected positive coefficients for  real output 
and price level, but gives an unexpected positive coefficient on the domestic interest 
rate.  The unexpected effect may again link to unaccounted risk.  Financial 
liberalisation and consequent increases in interest rates in the 1990s coincided  with 
adverse currency  movements.  The higher  interest rates may not have  been 
sufficient to compensate for the perceived increase in  risk of devaluation, hence 
despite raised interest rates,   people moved out of the domestic currency and caused 
the devaluation. 
  
While the above cointegrating equations indicate long run equilibrium relations the 
short run dynamics of the  system  are given by a vector  error correction model 
(VECM).  Deviations  from the equilibria can occur as a result of shocks and the 
coefficient on the cointegrating equations  (error correction terms) reveal the systemic 
feedback,  while the short term dynamics are given by coefficients on the lagged first 
differences.   The VECM results in table 3  show the short run parameters and 
feedback systems arising from exchange and money disequilibria. 
 
The overall results given in Table3  appear reasonable with both  long run  relations 
having some significant coefficients.  For deviations in money demand, the 
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adjustment coefficients for ∆m, ∆p,  & ∆R and are all significant and negative while 
the feedback of money on ∆y is positive but smaller and  not significant .  These 
results indicate that the long run domestic equilibrium relation has significant impact 
and that there is a complex feedback system.  The effect on inflation is perverse, but  
could reflect the omission of  a productivity effect which was being generated in the 
goods and labour market.  The short effects of  lagged changes of the other variables 
on the money demand equation do not appear to be significant while the error 
correction coefficient indicates that agents  adjust money holdings by 76% of the 
previous years deviation.   Deviations from the long run real exchange equilibrium 
have a significant positive feedback on money demand suggesting that devaluation  
has a predominant wealth effect. This occurs as  devaluation causes the domestic 
value of foreign assets to rise with a consequent  increase in the demand for domestic 
currency.  This significant wealth effect   suggests that there has been  a build up in 
the holding of overseas assets to avoid inflation and exchange risks.  Real exchange 
deviation also has a significant positive impact on GDP,  suggesting that the positive 
impact of cheaper exports  has outweighed any adverse import cost.  
 
Table 3: Results for VECM 
 
 ∆m ∆f ∆y ∆R ∆p 
Cointeg.equation(1) 
Domestic disequilibria 
Adjustment coefficient  
 
- 0.76* 
(0.21) 
 
- 0.22 
(0.47)  
 
0.17 
(0.09) 
 
- 0.23*
(0.10) 
 
- 0.62*
(0.24) 
Cointeg.equation(2) 
External disequilibria 
Adjustment coefficient 
 
    0.17* 
      (0.08) 
 
-0.41*
(0.19) 
 
0.10*
(0.04) 
 
0.08 
(0.04) 
 
-.0.01 
(0.10) 
∆m (-1) 
 
0.53*
(0.19) 
0.41 
(0.44) 
0.15 
(0.08) 
0.13 
(0.10) 
 
0.31 
(0.22) 
∆f (-1) 
 
0.19 
(0.12) 
0.90*
(0.28) 
-0.16*
(0.05) 
0.10 
(0.06) 
0.36 
(0.14) 
∆y (-1) 
 
-0.14 
(0.32) 
0.88 
0.72 
0.03 
(0.13) 
-0.01 
(0.16) 
-0.02 
(0.37) 
∆R (-1) 
 
-0.25 
(0.26) 
-0.38 
(0.59) 
0.24*
(0.11) 
0.08*
(0.13) 
0.71*
(0.30) 
∆ p (-1) 
 
-0.61 
(0.34) 
-1.21 
(0.78) 
0.16 
(0.15) 
0.25 
(0.17) 
-0.45 
(0.34) 
 
Notes: Parentheses give standard error, ‘*’ indicates significance at 5% 
 
Overall the results identify  long run money demand and purchasing parity  
relationships  and reveal the feedback systems for Jamaica.   As an input for policy 
formation, the estimates  indicate that money demand takes just over a year and  
exchange rate takes over two years to adjust to short run deviations.   However,  the 
interest rate relations, negligible short run  effects and perverse long run  effects, are 
slightly problematic for open market monetary policy. 
 
The effect of  a shock to the  policy variable, treasury bill rate (TBR) on money 
demand and real GDP can  be seen in the impulse responses (figure 4 ).   As indicated 
 15
in the estimations and discussion above, the demand for money  shows an unexpected 
increase in response to a tightened monetary policy (shock to TBR).  This reinforces 
the earlier evidence that in an undeveloped financial market, such as in Jamaica, there 
are few alternative assets, so that money demand is sensitive to the deposit rate 
(which shadows TBR).  Other perverse effects are apparent in inflation which 
increases and the exchange rate which devalues with the interest shock.  Real output 
declines . 
 
Figure 4 
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1.Variable names:  LM2 =  log M2:   INT = Treasury bill rate: LCPI = Log consumer 
price index,  LEXCHIND = log exchange rate index. 
 
Stability of the Money Demand Equation. 
 
The discussion so far indicates some problems for implementing an inflation targeting 
policy.  A possible cause of the identified perverse responses may be instability of the 
money demand relationship which then generated the unexpected interest coefficients.  
This section therefore investigates the parameter stability. 
 
The underlying determinants of money demand  could have been affected by the 
1990s financial crisis.  The crisis would have  caused a  loss of confidence in 
economic performance; in the banking and hence monetary system; and in the 
currency as it suffered  large and unpredictable devaluations.  
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Parameter stability was investigated using CUSUM and CUSUM SQUARE tests.3  
These require direct OLS estimation which was performed  by generating and 
including  a deviation  variable  (Bahmani-Oskooee 2001, 2002).   The approach uses 
the coefficient of  a  cointegrating vector to generate a deviation  variable, Z.  In the 
current money demand context these terms are: * *1 2, ,t t t t *Z m m Z f f where= − = −    
indicates the long run value generated by the estimated equation.  The money demand 
equation can then be directly  re-estimated by OLS and the cointegrating relationship 
has been imposed.  
 
The money equation estimated was: 
11 1 1 12 2 1 11 1 12 1 13 1 14 1 15 1t t t t t t tm Z Z m f y R ptα α β β β β β− − − − − −∆ = + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ −  
 
 Parameter stability was then  investigated using  a CUSUM and CUSUM SQUARE 
test.  The graphical  results (below) show both tests remaining within the 5% 
significance boundary indicating reasonable stability.  However, both tests show 
increased instability in the early 1990s period of extreme crisis but with some 
reversion in the second half of the decade.  This apparent reversion to the stable 
parameter relationship suggests that the government’s unorthodox rescue of financial 
institutions was successful in maintaining confidence in the domestic monetary 
system. 
 
When the above analysis is compared with Bjornland (2005), there are both 
similarities and differences.  Both here and in Bjornland, the analysis uses a 
cointegrating VAR and in both cases results indicate  structural stability of money 
demand despite a financial crisis.  However, whilst this paper develops the structural 
system built on two co-integrating vectors (CV),  Bjornland, identifies  two CVs, for 
money and GDP,  but then focuses on the single money demand CV.  There is also a 
difference in the interpretation of  the wealth effects associated with devaluation.   
 
 
Graph 5 
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Conclusions 
 
The investigation of  money demand within the framework of a  small  model has 
revealed the existence of two cointegrating relations which correspond to a domestic 
and external monetary equilibria.  The domestic equilibrium gives the  money demand 
equation.  When the  structural relation was estimated in a VEC system it revealed 
strong but apparently perverse long run effects of interest rates.  The unexpected 
relationships, suggest that standard monetary policy may yield perverse outcomes in 
an economy such as Jamaica which has  a poorly developed financial sector,  
 
The Jamaican Central Bank uses  open market interest rates to pursue its inflation 
target and in this context  a  stable money demand is necessary  for policy to have 
predictable results.  The CUSUM  investigation showed acceptable  parameter 
stability despite the serious financial crisis of the 1990’s.  This suggests that the early 
fall in money demand following the crisis was explained by traditional variables.  
This stability also suggests that the importance of accommodative financial strategy 
should not be judged with reference only to speed of recovery (Honohan, 2003) but 
with reference to its success in maintaining confidence, and hence an environment 
where outcomes of monetary policy continue to be  predictable.   
 
 
                                                 
Endnotes. 
2 Ghartey (1998) generates quarterly GDP but this approach was rejected for fear that it would mask 
 tests were used as they do not require a hypothesised break point 
some of the short run volatility and hence confuse the dynamics.   
3 These
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